Tag Archives: demography

The Changing Demographics of COVID-19

Health, Politics, , ,

The media have given us a stereotype of the Americans most likely to have contracted the coronavirus. You probably think of COVID-19 as a disease primarily affecting the country’s urban poor. You have probably also read the news that African-Americans, and possibly Latinos, have been stricken at a rate higher than their percentage of the population. These generalizations are accurate, but things are changing.

In a brief paper, Dr. William Frey of the Brookings Institution analyzed date compiled by the New York Times in order to compare the demographic characteristics of those counties hardest hit by the virus at different points in time.

In the above chart, the second bar from the left shows the characteristics of those counties with an infection rate of 100 or more per 100,000 population as of March 29. The bar at the left shows the population baselines. As you can see, the hardest hit counties were more likely to be in the Northeast, more urban, and more likely to have voted for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election.

The next three bars show the characteristics of the new counties that reached the 100/100,000 rate during each of the next three weeks. These counties are increasingly located in the West, South and Midwest, they are more suburban and rural, and they are more likely than the early counties to have voted for Trump. In other words, the counties that are most affected by the coronavirus are gradually coming to resemble the demographics of the country as a whole.

This table shows a similar picture. Majority-white counties are catching up with counties with more minorities. The newly-affected counties are less likely to have a large immigrant population. The income data, however, are less consistent with the media stereotype, since the early counties contain more higher income people. I assume this is because the virus first took hold in cities with high income inequality like New York and Seattle. Over time, however, the income distribution is starting to resemble the baseline for the country.

These demographic shifts seem likely to have political implications. At the very least, white rural Republicans are not going to be able to dismiss the pandemic as somebody else’s problem. Frey suggests that they will become less receptive to Trump’s attempts to reopen American businesses. Fear of mortality will spread. In the past, such external threats have tended to help conservative candidates, but the situation is far too volatile to make a one-sided prediction. Will some people who voted for Trump in 2016 blame him for not keeping the danger away from their community?

You may also be interested in reading:

Did Ebola Influence the 2014 Elections (Revisited)?

The Stress of Politics

Health, Politics, Social psychology, , ,

Since 2007, the American Psychological Association (APA) has contracted with the Harris Poll to conduct an annual survey of Stress in America. Respondents are asked to rate their typical level of stress on a 10-point scale, where 1 = little or no stress and 10 = a great deal of stress. They are also asked to rate a variety of sources of stress as either very significant, somewhat significant, not very significant or not significant.

Until now, the APA survey has been a lackluster affair, with average stress levels remaining pretty much the same from year to year, and the most significant sources of stress being money, work and the economy. But that changed with the 2016 survey, due to the addition of some questions about politics.

The 2016 survey was conducted in August, with a sample of 3511 U. S. adults aged 18 or older. Because so many respondents (52%) reported that the 2016 presidential campaign was a very or somewhat significant source of stress, APA did a followup in January 2017 to see if the political climate had cooled off. January’s survey had a reduced sample size of 1,109—still a respectable number. Unless otherwise specified, the data reported below are from this most recent survey.

The overall stress level increased between August and January, from 4.8 to 5.1 on the 10-point scale. While that may not sound like much of a change, this was the first time in the history of the survey that there was a statistically significant increase in stress between consecutive samples. The percentage of respondents reporting physical symptoms of stress also increased, from 71% in August to 80% in January. The most commonly-reported symptoms were headaches (34%), feeling overwhelmed (33%), feeling nervous or anxious (33%), and feeling depressed or sad (32%).

As in previous years, economic and job-related sources of stress were among the the most important. Sixty-one percent reported that money was a very or somewhat significant source of stress; 58% said the same for their work; and 50% for the nation’s economy. However, these numbers were rivaled by three stressors related to politics.

Not suprisingly, responses to two of these questions were influenced by political partisanship. Democrats were more likely than Republicans to be stressed by the election outcome (72% vs. 26%), and by concern about the future of the country (76% vs. 59%).

Stress about the election outcome was influenced by several demographic variables. It varied by race.

It also varied with age.

And it varied by place of residence.

Education also made a difference, with 53% of those with more than a high school education being stressed out by the election outcome, compared to 38% with a high school education or less.

Some stressors that were presidential campaign issues increased in importance since the last survey. Those saying that terrorism was a very or somewhat significant source of stress went from 51% in August to 59% in January. Those concerned about police violence toward minorities went from 36% to 44%. And the rate of concern over one’s own personal safety increased from 29% to 34%.

Here’s the breakdown of concern about police violence by race. Black respondents appeared to show a ceiling effect. Their stress level didn’t increase very much because it was quite high to begin with.

Americans are usually described as apathetic about politics.  Partisan political conflict usually declines after a presidential campaign is over, but that hasn’t happened this year. Stress over the election outcome is almost as high (49%) as stress over the campaign itself was (52%). It is tempting to attribute this to a growing awareness among Americans that they have elected a man who is unfit to be president, or to the fact that Republicans seem determined to proceed with a political agenda most of which is not supported by a majority of citizens. Unfortunately, we don’t have historical data with which to compare stress over this election outcome to the same question after the 2000 and 2008 elections.

We also can’t be certain whether the rhetoric of the presidential campaign increased concern over terrorism, police violence and our personal safety, since perceptions of those stressors may have been influenced by real events that occurred between August and January, i.e., actual acts of terrorism or police violence. However, it seems obvious that Donald Trump tried to elevate anxiety about terrorism and personal safety to an unrealistically high level. The APA survey suggest that he may have been successful. Whether Hillary Clinton’s campaign raised concerns about police violence is less clear, since she typically called for greater respect for the police as well as clearer use of force guidelines.

You may also be interested in reading:

So Far, It Looks Like It Was the Racism

Why the Minority Rules

Framing the Debates

The Public Wants Renewables

Environment, Politics,

As President Trump (gulp!) signed executive orders reviving the Keystone XL oil pipeline and expediting the Dakota Access pipeline, the Pew Research Center this week released the results of a survey of attitudes toward energy development priorities. The survey was conducted on January 4-9 with a representative sample of 1502 U. S. adults.

Respondents were asked: “Which one of the following do you think should be the more important priority for addressing America’s energy supply?” Here are the results:

The percentage choosing renewables was up from 60% the last time the question was asked, in December 2014.

There continues to be a large divide between Democrats and Republicans on this issue, as shown below. However, it should be noted that there was a virtual tie among Republican and Republican-leaning respondents, with 45% choosing renewable energy and 44% choosing fossil fuels.

The other demographic that produced large differences was age, as shown here:

While Trump plans to weaken the power of the Environmental Protection Agency, a Pew survey conducted between November 30 and December 5 found that 59% of U. S. adults say stricter environmental laws and regulations are worth the cost, while 34% say they cost too many jobs and hurt the economy.

It should be noted that attitudes toward renewable energy are much less polarized than attitudes toward climate change, where 88% of Democrats and Democrat leaners see climate change as a major threat to our well-being, compared to only 12% of Republicans and Republican leaners. This could mean that Americans have decided that investing in renewable energy would be a good idea even if the climate were not changing.

Imagine how many Americans would favor expansion of wind and solar energy if the corporate media were to present accurate information about the costs of alternative forms of energy.

You May also be interested in reading:

China Gets Smart While We Get Stupid

Cheap Solar Changes Everything

The Cost of Climate Inaction

More Bad News for Religion

Religion, Social psychology,

In May, I reported on the Pew Research Center’s 2014 Religious Landscape Study, a survey of a quota sample of 35,000 adults, with a margin of error of plus or minus .6%. The first installment of their results concentrated on the size and demographic characteristics of various religious groups. The big news was that Americans with no religious affiliation (the “nones”) increased from 16% in 2007 to 23% in 2014, while those calling themselves Christians dropped from 78% to 71%. The biggest increase in the percentage of nones occurred among Milennials—people born after 1980.

Pew has published a second installment of results from the survey, focusing on religious beliefs and practices. The share of Americans who say they believe in God has declined from 92% in 2007 to 89% in 2014, while those who claim to be “absolutely certain” that God exists dropped from 71% to 63%. These declines are most pronounced among younger adults. This chart breaks down a number of superstitious beliefs and practices by age. All of them have declined since 2007.

in-many-ways-younger-americans-are-less-religious-than-older-americans

Pew also looked at the political beliefs of religious and nonreligious participants. Acceptance of homosexuality has increased dramatically among both religious and nonreligious participants, while support for abortion is relatively unchanged. For the first time, the nones are now the largest single group (28%) among Democrats. Evangelical Protestants are the largest group (38%) of Republicans. Not surprisingly given their political affiliations, religious people are more likely than nones to oppose government aid to the poor, to oppose stricter environmental regulations, and to see increased immigration as a change for the worse. Belief in evolution differs sharply between affiliated (55%) and nonaffiliated people (82%), and is nearly universal among atheists (95%) and agnostics (96%).

By and large, Americans see religion as a force for good in the society. Eighty-nine percent say that churches “bring people together and strengthen community bonds,” 87% say they “play an important role in helping the poor and needy,” and 75% say they “protect and strengthen morality in society.” However, some of these claims are becoming harder to defend in light of recent research. There is strong evidence that American religious people are higher in racism than nonreligious Americans. A recent study looks at some related moral behaviors.

Altruism refers to behavior that benefits others at some cost to oneself. Although there are studies that suggest that religious people report more charitable giving than nonreligious people, these self-reports are suspect since religious people are more likely to engage in socially desirable responding–a tendency to over-report one’s good behavior and under-report the bad. On the other hand, the research is fairly clear that religious people are more punitive in their evaluations of bad behavior than nonreligious people. For example, religiously affiliated whites are more likely to support the death penalty than unaffiliated whites. (Large majorities of black and Hispanic Americans oppose the death penalty regardless of religious affiliation.)

Dr. Jean Decety of the University of Chicago and his colleagues studied moral behavior among a broad and diverse sample of 1,170 children aged 5-12 in six countries (Canada, China, Jordan, South Africa, Turkey, and the US). Children were assigned to the religious affiliation reported by their parents. They were 24% Christian, 43% Muslim, and 28% nonreligious. Other religions were not reported often enough to include in the statistical analysis.

Altruism was measured using the Dictator Game, in which children were allowed to divide an attractive resource—in this case, ten stickers—between themselves a peer. The measure is the number of stickers shared with others. Religiously affiliated children were less generous than nonaffiliated children, with no significant difference in generosity between Christians and Muslims. Importantly, the negative association between religion and altruism was greater among the older children (aged 8-12), suggesting that as children come to understand their family’s beliefs better, the differences between those from religious and nonreligious families increase.

decety

To measure punitiveness, the authors had children watch videos depicting mild interpersonal harms and asked them to evaluate the “meanness” of the behavior and to suggest a level of punishment for the perpetrator. Religious children saw these behaviors as more “mean” and suggested greater punishment than nonreligious children. Muslim children evaluated the behaviors more negatively than Christian children.

The authors also asked the parents of these children to rate them on empathy and sensitivity to justice. In contrast to the actual behavior of the children, the religious parents rated their children as higher in empathy than the nonreligious parents. They also rated their children as more sensitive to justice. This could be another instance of socially desirable responding by the religious parents.

If these results, as well as the differences in prejudice and discrimination, were more widely known, people might be less likely to see religion as a force for good in society and less likely to favor exempting religious institutions from taxation.

You may also be interested in reading:

And Then There Were Nones

Power and Corruption, Part 1

And Then There Were Nones

Religion

Last year, I posted the results of the General Social Survey showing that, in 2012, 20% of American adults reported themselves as having “no religion,” and that these folks—referred to by demographers as the “nones”—are increasing by about .6% per year. This month, the Pew Research Group released the results of their 2014 Religious Landscape Study. This survey, undertaken every seven years, is based on the results of a quota sample of over 35,000 adults and has a margin of error of plus or minus .6%. Although Pew refers to their nones as “unaffiliated,” the results are strikingly consistent.

Pew reports that 22.8% of the population were nones in 2014, up 6.7% from 16.1% in 2007. Meanwhile, those calling themselves Christians declined from 78.4% to 70.6%. This amounts to an increase of 19 million nones, for a new total of 56 million. Among all religious groups, the nones are second in size only to evangelical Protestants. A followup question showed that, of this 22.8%, 3.1% said they were atheists, 4% claimed to be agnostic, and 15.8% believed “nothing in particular.” This leaves open the possibility that some of the nones engage in spiritual practices, pray, or believe in one or more gods. There was also a 6% increase in those saying that religion is “not too” or “not at all important” in their lives.

religionbig-png

 

The Pew researchers offer two explanations for this shift.

  • Generational replacement. The most dramatic increases in the percentage of nones occurred among younger adults. However, they increased across all generations, even rising by 2% among people over 70.
  • Switching religions. Among those who report switching their religious affiliation, the nones showed the largest gains of any group. Eighteen percent of Americans who were raised in a religious faith now claim to be unaffiliated.

Another perspective on this trend comes from the 2015 State of Atheism in America, a study by the Barna Group. It combines the results of four surveys of 23,000 adults conducted in 2011 through 2014. The Barna Group calls their nones the “unchurched,” meaning that they say they haven’t attended church in the last six months. This results in a larger group, about 36% of the total. They find that 25% of the unchurched are either atheists or agnostics, a group they call “skeptics.” I find this a more interesting group than folks who believe “nothing in particular,” since they would seem to have given some thought to religion.

The Barna Group identifies five demographic shifts among their skeptics when they are compared to the same group in a 1993 survey they conducted.

bu-032415-IG-2

  1. They are younger. In fact, 34% of them are between 18 and 30.
  2. They are more educated. Half of them are college graduates. Only 32% of Americans over 25 have graduated from college.
  3. A higher percentage are women. Male skepticism increased too, but not as much as among women.
  4. They are more racially diverse. This is due largely to an increase in skepticism among Hispanics and especially Asians.
  5. They are more regionally dispersed. The Northeast and West continue to have higher percentages of skeptics, but the differences are not as great as in the past.

The last three trends suggest a mainstreaming of skepticism. Rather than being a distinctive subgroup, atheists and agnostics are becoming more broadly representative of the population. One major exception, however, is the continuing underrepresentation of African-Americans.

The Barna Group’s stated goal is to reconnect with skeptics and bring them back under the influence of superstition, so they asked skeptics what they thought of Christian churches. They note four common responses, although they don’t report the percentages who gave each one.

  1. The church is group of people who share a physical space but are not otherwise connected to one another in meaningful ways.
  2. The church adds little of value to their community.
  3. The church stands for the wrong political policies: war, sexual and physical violence, prevention of gay marriage and reproductive freedom, etc.
  4. Church leaders are not trustworthy.

The third response supports the backlash hypothesis—that young people are leaving the Christian religion because they disagree with its conservative politics.

What can we conclude from all of this? Due to the positive association of religiosity with age, the percentage of nones is likely to continue to increase. This is good news for liberals. In an earlier post, I presented evidence suggesting that the most important causes of religiosity are poverty and lack of education. Barring an increase in the financial desperation of the middle class or a weakening of our system of public education—both very real possibilities—the future of organized religion does not seem very bright.

You may also be interested in reading:

The Revolt of the Nones, Part 1

The Revolt of the Nones, Part 2

The God Squad, Part 1: Religion as Selfish Individualism