Tag Archives: altruism

Publicizing Bystander Intervention

Media, Social psychology, , ,

John Tumpane is a hero. On Wednesday, June 28, this Major League Baseball umpire was crossing the Roberto Clemente Bridge on his way to PNC Park in Pittsburgh, where he was to call ball and strikes in the Pirates’ game against the Tampa Bay Rays that night. He spotted a 23-year-old woman who had climbed over the railing and was looking down at the Allegheny River. As it turned out, she intended to commit suicide. Mr. Tumpane calmly attempted to talk her out of it, and eventually, with the help of some other passers-by, physically restrained her from jumping while another bystander called 911.

Believe it or not, an umpire is applauded at PNC Park.

Mr. Tumpane received a standing ovation at PNC Park the following night, and the story received both local and some national attention in the news media, including a front-page article in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette the following day, quoting Dr. Christine Moutier of the American Foundation for Suicide Prevention saying that he did all the right things. From the perspective of social psychology, the important point is that he didn’t fall victim to the bystander effect.

The bystander effect does not refer to the failure of bystanders to intervene in an emergency. It refers to the paradoxical finding that the greater the number of bystanders, the less likely and more slowly they are to intervene. Two social psychologists, John Darley and Bibb Latane, read about the 1964 murder of Kitty Genovese in New York City. It was originally reported that 38 people had witnessed the assault, yet no one intervened or called the police for 35 minutes. Darley and Latane hypothesized that the large number of bystanders was the key to understanding their failure to take action, and initiated a research program demonstrating that helping declines as group size increases. Researchers have recently concluded that the original news reports of Ms. Genovese’s death were exaggerated. Not all 38 people actually witnessed the murder and some of them called the police sooner than was originally reported. Nevertheless, the bystander effect has been replicated in dozens of studies.

Kitty Genovese and her Queens, New York neighborhood.

It’s not that surprising that bystanders fail to intervene. As Darley and Latane point out, a bystander must successfully work through five steps before intervention can take place. He or she must:

  • Notice the event
  • Interpret it as an emergency
  • Assume responsibility
  • Know the appropriate form of assistance
  • Implement a decision to help

The presence of others can interfere at any of these steps, but particularly the second and the third, where bystander intervention can be inhibited by either pluralistic ignorance or diffusion of responsibility.

Pluralistic ignorance. Is this really a suicide attempt, or is the young woman just clowning around? It would be embarrassing to make a fool of oneself by overreacting to a benign event. When in doubt, we look to other bystanders for cues to their interpretation of the situation. But they may also be trying to appear outwardly calm, looking to us for information. As a result, the bystanders could fall victim to pluralistic ignorance, in which a group of people arrive at a definition of the situation that is different from their individual first impressions. They may come to believe that nothing is wrong because no one else looks concerned.

We know from the newspaper article that Mr. Tumpane was initially uncertain about whether he was witnessing an emergency. He asked a couple in front of him, “What’s this lady trying to do?” and they said, “I don’t know.” Fortunately, this did not deter him from interpreting the situation as a possible emergency.

Diffusion of responsibility. We don’t know how many people were on the Clemente Bridge that afternoon. The article says it was “mostly empty.” This may have helped Mr. Tumpane to avoid diffusion of responsibility. If only one person had been aware of the emergency and failed to intervene, he or she might be considered responsible for the woman’s death. But the greater the number of bystanders, the more responsibility is diffused, or spread out, among the witnesses. With many bystanders, no one feels responsible.

Since there were at least a few other bystanders on the bridge that afternoon, we can credit Mr. Tumpane with taking the lead in assuming responsibility. He also knew how to help a person in distress and did so skillfully.

By the way, one of the take-homes from this research is that if you are ever the victim of an emergency in a busy environment, it is best to single out one of the bystanders (to avoid diffusion of responsibility), tell this person that you need help (to avoid pluralistic ignorance), and, if possible, tell him or her exactly what you need, i.e., “Call 911!”

Failures of bystanders to intervene in emergencies are often publicized by the news media. Such stories may unintentionally increase cynicism. Fortunately, Mr. Tumpane’s helpfulness also received media attention and recognition.

Another place people hear about bystander intervention or its absence is in social psychology classes. One group of researchers randomly assigned students to hear a lecture either on Darley and Latane’s experiments, which included information about how to respond appropriately to an emergency, or a totally different topic (the control group). Two weeks later, as part of what they thought was an unrelated study, each of these students encountered a young man lying motionless on the floor. Was he sick or injured, or merely drunk or asleep? Only 25% of the students in the control group stopped to help the student, but 43% of those who had heard the lecture on bystander intervention stopped to help. Far from perfect, but better.

People often claim they would like the media to tell them more good news. Publicizing successful instances of bystander intervention, along with information about how best to intervene, would seem to be win-win for both the news media and future victims of emergencies.

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Here I Am. Do You See Me?

More Bad News for Religion

Correction

Correction

Religion, Social psychology

In November 2015, I reported a study of 1170 children from six countries (Canada, China, Jordan, South Africa, Turkey, and the US) by Jean Ducety and his colleagues. The study appeared to show that children from Christian and Muslim households were less altruistic when playing a laboratory game than children from religiously unaffiliated households. It now appears that their conclusion was incorrect.

When correlating religion with altruism, it is necessary to statistically control unwanted variables that might explain both religiosity and altruism. The Ducety team claimed to have controlled for the age, socioeconomic status, and country of origin of their participants. However, a team of researchers headed by Azim Shariff pointed out that, although Ducety and his colleagues intended to statistically control for country of origin, they used a statistically incorrect procedure. When the data were reanalyzed correctly, the association between religion and altruism was no longer statistically significant. This is primarily due to low levels of generosity among children from South Africa and Turkey, two countries with a high level of religious affiliation.

The correct conclusion, then, is that religion has no effect on altruistic behavior. I’m not sure that religious people will be happy with this conclusion, but at least it’s less embarrassing than Ducety’s conclusion. Shariff and his colleagues also point out the following:

  • When nationality was controlled correctly, there was no longer an association between religion and the punitiveness of the children.
  • The association between religion and parents’ claims that their children are higher in empathy also disappeared when the data were reanalyzed.
  • However, there was still a significant association between family devoutness and the altruism of the children, with children from highly religious families being less generous than children from moderately religious homes.

This is an embarrassment for the Ducety group. Had the data been analyzed correctly, the study would probably not have been published.

In 2015, Sharif reported the results of a meta-analysis of 31 studies showing that, while religious people claim to engage in more prosocial behavior on self-report measures, there is no consistent effect of religion on behavioral tasks measuring altruism, such as the one used by Ducety group. He explains this in two ways. First, religious people are more likely to engage in socially desirable responding in which they exaggerate their good behavior. Secondly, laboratory tasks measuring altruism do not contain the contextual cues that sometimes elicit prosocial behavior in the real world, such as being asked by a clergyman to donate money.

In support of this second explanation, Sharif points to a second, separate meta-analysis of 25 studies of religious priming on prosocial behavior. In these studies, participants perform a task intended to remind them of their religious beliefs, such as reading Biblical passages, and are then given an opportunity to behave more or less generously. These studies find that religious primes increase the altruism of religious people, but have no effect on non-religious people.

Sharif explains the effects of religious primes in two ways. First, some religious rituals such as hymn-singing and prayer may create the emotional conditions which encourage people to behave prosocially. Secondly, these primes may remind religious people that they believe they are being observed by supernatural agents who will punish them if they behave badly.

My takeaway from Sharif’s research is that most opportunities for altruistic behavior in the real world probably do not contain religious primes. If I’m right, we should usually not expect religious people to practice the values that are preached to them.

An optional wonkish addendum:

Any time you do a correlational study, you must consider the possibility that your results are explained by some other variable that accidentally coincides with both of the variables of interest. For example, if you find that people who live near nuclear power plants are more likely to die of cancer, you must consider the possibility that poor people are more likely to live near nuclear power plants, and their poverty is the cause of their death rather than their exposure to radiation.

The usual approach to such alternative explanations is to remove their impact on the data through statistical analysis. However, it is not always clear whether an alternative explanation is a source of error which should be removed, or an integral part of the variable of interest.

The Shariff group seems to be saying that if children’s ungenerous behavior can be explained by their country of origin, it need no longer be attributed to their religion. But in a country like Turkey, where 99.8% of its citizens are Muslims, how can you separate its religion from the rest of its culture? In fact, statistically controlling for Turkish nationality precludes the possibility that the Muslim religion of its children will have any affect on the outcome of the study. Was this the right decision? (The situation in South Africa is less extreme, since only 80% of South Africans are Christians.)

An analogy may help. Suppose I do a survey of the gender gap in the salaries of U. S. adults. I statistically control for variables like age, socioeconomic status, education, work experience, etc., and I find that men are paid more than women for the same job. But suppose a critic maintains that tall people are respected more than short people, and therefore paid more. He argues that I am obligated to statistically control for the height of my respondents. Since men are on average taller than women, when I statistically eliminate the effect of height, the association between gender and salary disappears. Does this mean that women are not discriminated against in the workplace, but only short people are?

You might argue that this is a bad analogy because gender is a more plausible explanation for wage discrimination than height. But is nationality a more plausible explanation for lack of altruism than religion? Or did it only seem that way because the negative effect of religion on altruism was unexpected?

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More Bad News For Religion

The Invisible Hand

Economics, Social psychology, ,

We live in a market economy. We are frequently exposed to reminders of money. Does living under capitalism change our behavior? In a classic paper, social psychologists Margaret Clark and Judson Mills distinguished between communal relationships such as those that exist between family members and friends, and exchange relationships such as those that occur in business. Different norms apply to these two types of relationships. For example, people in an exchange relationship keep track of each other’s inputs into a joint task, while people in a communal relationship keep track of each other’s needs.

Several studies suggest that leading participants to think about money changes their behavior in predictable ways. These studies use cognitive priming to create subtle reminders of money. For example, participants may be asked to unscramble words into meaningful sentences. In one condition, all the sentences just happen to be about money, while in another condition they are about something else. In general, thinking about money increases achievement on difficult tasks, but decreases altruism or helping behavior.

In the latest contribution to this research, Agata Gaslorowska and her colleagues report four experiments done with Polish children aged 3 to 6. The priming manipulation was a sorting task. The children in the money condition were asked to sort 25 coins into three different denominations. Those in the control group sorted nonmonetary objects, such as buttons or hard candies.

Two of the experiments involved motivation and performance. In one of them, children who had handled money were more likely to complete a difficult labyrinth puzzle than those in the control group. In the second, those in the money condition spent a longer time working at what was essentially an insoluble task, a jigsaw puzzle intended for older children.

The other two studies involved willingness to help another child. In the third experiment, children were given an opportunity to help by bringing the child red crayons from across the room. Those who had sorted money brought fewer crayons than those in the control group. The final study measured self-interested behavior as well as altruism. As a reward for being in the study, the children were allowed to choose up to six stickers for themselves. Those who had handled money took more stickers. Then the children were asked if they would donate some of their stickers to another child who had not participated in the study. Those in the money condition donated fewer of their stickers. The results are shown below.

For each percentage of stickers donated, the graph shows the percentage of children in that condition who donated at least that percentage of their stickers. It should be noted that sorting candies put the children in a better mood than sorting buttons or coins, but mood was unrelated to helping in this experiment.

These experiments show that thinking about money affects the behavior of 3 to 6-year-old children in ways that are similar to its effects on adults. These kids had only a limited understanding of money. For example, they were unable to identify, at better than chance, which coin would buy the most candy. Nevertheless, they were aware enough of the function of money for it to change their behavior.

One of the authors of the study, Kathleen Vohs, proposes that the unifying thread in all these money studies is that thinking about money causes people to place a greater value on self-sufficiency. In another of her studies, adults primed with thoughts of money were more likely to choose to work alone rather than with another participant. If it’s good to be self-sufficient, this could explain why people in need are seen as less deserving of help.

Sociologist Robert Putnam, in his book Bowling Alone, presents data suggesting that over the last 50 years, Americans have engaged in fewer group and community activities and more solitary ones, with the result that we are less cooperative and trusting. Ironically, Putnam uses a market metaphor to summarize his theory. He says the disintegration of communal relationships reduces social capital, giving society fewer resources that can be used for the public good in times of need.

Michael Sandel, a political philosopher, argues that we have gone from having a market economy to being a market society. Public goods are increasingly privatized and virtually everything is for sale if the price is right. He summarizes his critique in this TED talk.

Since most of us have never lived under any other economic system, we are largely unaware of how capitalism affects our behavior. However, some of us spend more time handling and thinking about money than others. In one study, college students majoring in economics behaved less cooperatively in a bargaining game than students majoring in other fields. Studies consistently show that poor people are more generous and helpful than rich people.

These studies have something to appeal to people of all political persuasions. Conservatives will no doubt be pleased to learn that thinking about money encourages hard work and achievement. On the other hand, the finding that the market society replaces helpfulness with selfishness confirms an important part of the liberal critique of capitalism.

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More Bad News For Religion

On Obama’s Speech

Power and Corruption, Part 1

More Bad News for Religion

Religion, Social psychology,

In May, I reported on the Pew Research Center’s 2014 Religious Landscape Study, a survey of a quota sample of 35,000 adults, with a margin of error of plus or minus .6%. The first installment of their results concentrated on the size and demographic characteristics of various religious groups. The big news was that Americans with no religious affiliation (the “nones”) increased from 16% in 2007 to 23% in 2014, while those calling themselves Christians dropped from 78% to 71%. The biggest increase in the percentage of nones occurred among Milennials—people born after 1980.

Pew has published a second installment of results from the survey, focusing on religious beliefs and practices. The share of Americans who say they believe in God has declined from 92% in 2007 to 89% in 2014, while those who claim to be “absolutely certain” that God exists dropped from 71% to 63%. These declines are most pronounced among younger adults. This chart breaks down a number of superstitious beliefs and practices by age. All of them have declined since 2007.

in-many-ways-younger-americans-are-less-religious-than-older-americans

Pew also looked at the political beliefs of religious and nonreligious participants. Acceptance of homosexuality has increased dramatically among both religious and nonreligious participants, while support for abortion is relatively unchanged. For the first time, the nones are now the largest single group (28%) among Democrats. Evangelical Protestants are the largest group (38%) of Republicans. Not surprisingly given their political affiliations, religious people are more likely than nones to oppose government aid to the poor, to oppose stricter environmental regulations, and to see increased immigration as a change for the worse. Belief in evolution differs sharply between affiliated (55%) and nonaffiliated people (82%), and is nearly universal among atheists (95%) and agnostics (96%).

By and large, Americans see religion as a force for good in the society. Eighty-nine percent say that churches “bring people together and strengthen community bonds,” 87% say they “play an important role in helping the poor and needy,” and 75% say they “protect and strengthen morality in society.” However, some of these claims are becoming harder to defend in light of recent research. There is strong evidence that American religious people are higher in racism than nonreligious Americans. A recent study looks at some related moral behaviors.

Altruism refers to behavior that benefits others at some cost to oneself. Although there are studies that suggest that religious people report more charitable giving than nonreligious people, these self-reports are suspect since religious people are more likely to engage in socially desirable responding–a tendency to over-report one’s good behavior and under-report the bad. On the other hand, the research is fairly clear that religious people are more punitive in their evaluations of bad behavior than nonreligious people. For example, religiously affiliated whites are more likely to support the death penalty than unaffiliated whites. (Large majorities of black and Hispanic Americans oppose the death penalty regardless of religious affiliation.)

Dr. Jean Decety of the University of Chicago and his colleagues studied moral behavior among a broad and diverse sample of 1,170 children aged 5-12 in six countries (Canada, China, Jordan, South Africa, Turkey, and the US). Children were assigned to the religious affiliation reported by their parents. They were 24% Christian, 43% Muslim, and 28% nonreligious. Other religions were not reported often enough to include in the statistical analysis.

Altruism was measured using the Dictator Game, in which children were allowed to divide an attractive resource—in this case, ten stickers—between themselves a peer. The measure is the number of stickers shared with others. Religiously affiliated children were less generous than nonaffiliated children, with no significant difference in generosity between Christians and Muslims. Importantly, the negative association between religion and altruism was greater among the older children (aged 8-12), suggesting that as children come to understand their family’s beliefs better, the differences between those from religious and nonreligious families increase.

decety

To measure punitiveness, the authors had children watch videos depicting mild interpersonal harms and asked them to evaluate the “meanness” of the behavior and to suggest a level of punishment for the perpetrator. Religious children saw these behaviors as more “mean” and suggested greater punishment than nonreligious children. Muslim children evaluated the behaviors more negatively than Christian children.

The authors also asked the parents of these children to rate them on empathy and sensitivity to justice. In contrast to the actual behavior of the children, the religious parents rated their children as higher in empathy than the nonreligious parents. They also rated their children as more sensitive to justice. This could be another instance of socially desirable responding by the religious parents.

If these results, as well as the differences in prejudice and discrimination, were more widely known, people might be less likely to see religion as a force for good in society and less likely to favor exempting religious institutions from taxation.

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And Then There Were Nones

Power and Corruption, Part 1