Category Archives: War and peace

Things That Never Change

Media, War and peace, , ,

               It’s deja vu all over again.

                                                  Yogi Berra

Some thoughts on the corporate media’s coverage of the Middle East crisis in the two weeks since President Donald Trump ordered the assassination of Iranian General Qasem Suleimani:

The corporate media’s initial response was uncritical acceptance of the Trump administration’s justification for the attack.

There is near universal agreement that media coverage of the George W. Bush administration’s justifications for the 2003 invasion of Iraq was a total failure. The media reported without skepticism our government’s false claims that Saddam Hussein was stockpiling weapons of mass destruction and that he had participated indirectly in the 9/11 attacks. A 2003 study by Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) found that pro-war commentators greatly outnumbered anti-war voices on the major networks during the run-up to and early days of the invasion. If fact, only 3% of American sources could be classified as anti-war. People’s misperceptions continued long after the war and were systematically related to the coverage provided by their preferred news sources.

This month, the media are continuing in their traditional role as “stenographers to power,” dutifully reporting that Suleimani’s assassination was necessary to prevent “imminent” future attacks on Americans. Following unwritten rules, it was only after Congresspeople began to question the administration’s claims that the media began to focus on technicalities such as Trump’s failure to consult Congress. Unfortunately, this “he said/she said” journalism was not followed by any serious attempt to discover the truth.

Trump eventually contributed to the partial unraveling of the rationale for his attack by making embarrassingly inconsistent claims that his own subordinates were unwilling to confirm, i.e., “I believe it would have been four embassies.” In the end, Trump concluded that whether Suleimani posed an imminent threat “doesn’t really matter because of his horrible past.”

In fact, there was almost a consensus among politicians and media commentators that Suleimani deserved to die, since he was a “terrorist.” He was said to have helped Iraqi dissidents to kill American soldiers with roadside bombs. (Trump: “Great percentages of people don’t have legs right now, or arms, because of this son of a bitch.”) Presumably, the Iraqis are too dumb to have constructed such bombs on their own. But even if this charge is true, terrorism is defined as violence directed at civilians, not at soldiers and “contractors,” i.e., mercenaries, who have occupied Iraq since our illegal invasion in 2003.

The media’s pro-war bias is facilitated by their almost exclusive reliance on “expert” commentators who are current and former government employees, including retired generals.

Within a few weeks, someone will undoubtedly publish an analysis similar to the 2003 FAIR study showing that hawkish voices predominated during these past two weeks. As we wait, I want to make two points.

  • Many of these pro-war voices turn out, on closer inspection, to be owners or directors of, or consultants to, weapons manufacturers; for example, Barry McCaffrey (Raytheon), Michael Chertoff (BAE Systems), and Jeh Johnson (Lockheed-Martin) . These financial conflicts of interest are almost never disclosed on the air.
  • If one were looking for a true expert on the Middle Eastern conflict, a logical choice might be someone who had opposed the disastrous 2003 invasion. There are such people. Some of them are still in Congress. (One of them is even running for President.) However, the socialization of media personnel is so complete that looking for this source of information is unlikely to even occur to them. Instead, we hear the same old voices that have been so wrong so many times in the past.

Iran may well be another Iraq waiting to happen. That Trump and his advisors believe that we can get Iran to capitulate with “maximum pressure” shows how little they know about the Middle East. Trump, like Obama before him, is testing the limits of presidential war powers. But short of a mass movement taking to the streets, what’s to stop him? A recent survey shows that over two-thirds (69%) of voters want an end to the “war on terror” in Afghanistan and the Middle East. But does public opinion make any difference?

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The Political Uses of Fear

Politics, Social psychology, War and peace, , ,
Auschwitz

This post returns to a theme I’ve discussed before: Events that evoke fear in the population, and the publicity given to those events, can cause conservative shifts in public attitudes and work to the advantage of right-wing politicians. In previous posts, I’ve reported on the effects of terrorist attacks and the spread of the Ebola virus. A new study by a group of Israeli and American psychologists headed by Daphna Canetti looks at the effect of reminders of the Holocaust on Israeli public opinion. As they point out, in spite of the passage of over 70 years, the collective trauma of the Holocaust is still a central component of Jewish identity, and Israeli politicians often refer to alleged “lessons” of the Holocaust.

In the first of four studies, a community sample of 57 Jewish Israelis was asked to complete a packet of questionnaires. They were randomly assigned to the Holocaust-salience condition or or one of two control groups. The Holocaust salience group was given this instruction:

Please think about the murder of six million Jews by the Nazis during the Holocaust. What thoughts do you have about the Holocaust? Please briefly describe the emotions that you have when you think about the murder of six million Jews during the holocaust.

In one control group, they were asked to think about “your personal death” rather than the Holocaust. In a second control group, the Holocaust was replace by “severe physical pain.” Subsequently, participants were asked to what extent they defined themselves as Zionists, and filled out an 11-item questionnaire measuring support for military rather than diplomatic solutions to Israel’s conflict with Iran, i.e., “Israeli Defense Forces should strike Iran’s nuclear facilities.”

The results showed that participants in the Holocaust-salience condition showed greater support for an aggressive foreign policy than participants in either the Death or Pain conditions, and that the effect of Holocaust salience on militancy was mediated by ideological support for Zionism. That is, Holocaust salience increased endorsement of Zionism, which in turn increased support for a militant foreign policy. (Please see this previous post for an explanation of how mediation is tested.)

Experiment 2 was designed to demonstrate that thinking about the Holocaust does not inevitably increase support for warlike solutions to problems. It depends on how the Holocaust is framed. Framing refers to the way in which information is presented. It involves selecting some aspects of a situation and making them more salient. For example, people are more likely to choose to have an operation if they are told that there is a 75% chance they will live than if they are told that there is a 25% chance they will die.

In this study, participants were assigned to either the Holocaust-Jewish condition, in which the Holocaust was framed as “a crime against the Jewish people,” the Holocaust-Human condition, in which it was described as “a crime against humanity,” or the Pain control group. In addition to the previous questions, participants were asked about their willingness to compromise in order to achieve peace with the Palestinians. The results showed that only the Holocaust-Jewish frame increased support for warlike policies toward the Iranians and the Palestinians, and once again, the effect was mediated by identification with Zionism.

The final two studies attempted to bring a touch of realism to the previous laboratory experiments. On January 27, Israel celebrates Holocaust Remembrance Day. At midday, a siren goes off and everyone is asked to stop whatever they’re doing and think about the Holocaust for a minute. There are also Holocaust-themed events and programs in the mass media. In Study 3, 157 participants completed a questionnaire about their participation in Holocaust Day activities. As expected, the greater their personal participation in Holocaust Remembrance Day, the greater their support for Zionism and a militant foreign policy.

It should be noted that this study does not support the claim that participation in Holocaust Remembrance Day causes pro-war attitudes. It is equally possible that more conservative Israelis participated in more Holocaust Day activities.

Study 4 was a survey of a representative sample of 867 Israeli Jews. Although the first three studies involved temporary increases in the salience of the Holocaust, the authors were also interested in long-term exposure to Holocaust imagery. Holocaust survivors and their descendants can be expected to think about the Holocaust more often than average Israelis. Therefore, they compared a Holocaust group, consisting of Holocaust survivors, or the children and grandchildren of Holocaust survivors, to a non-Holocaust group. The second variable was personal exposure to political violence. It was measured by asking participants whether they had suffered an injury to themselves, a family member or a friend as a result of a rocket or terror attack, or whether they had personally witnessed a terror attack or its immediate aftermath.

Neither Holocaust survival nor personal exposure to terrorism alone predicted attitudes toward war and peace, but those respondents who were both from Holocaust survivor families and had personal experience with political violence held Zionist attitudes, were more politically militant and were less willing to compromise for peace. The authors concluded that both short-term and long-term exposure to Holocaust imagery encouraged Israeli citizens to generalize from the Holocaust to Israel’s current conflicts with its neighbors, and to support aggressive military solutions to those conflicts.

It would be presumptuous of me to suggest what lessons Israelis should take from the Holocaust. However, it is not obvious that the only conclusion that follows from the Holocaust is that they should refuse to negotiate with their adversaries, or that they should engage in preemptive attacks on them. War crimes can sometimes be prevented by making peace.

In October 2015, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in a speech that Adolf Hitler had not intended to exterminate the Jews, but that the idea had been personally suggested to him by a Palestinian, the grand mufti of Jerusalem. His comments were denounced by Israeli historians as a lie and a disgrace, but, given his current political stance, it’s easy to see why Netanyahu would want to encourage such a belief. If Canetti’s studies are widely publicized by the Israeli media, Israelis can be forewarned about the cynical misuse of Holocaust imagery for political advantage.

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Deep Background

Invisible Inequality

Economics, Health, War and peace, ,

The people who benefit least from American capitalism are mostly likely to be killed or maimed defending it, according to a new paper entitled “Invisible Inequality: The Two Americas of Military Sacrifice” by political scientist Douglas Kriner and law professor Francis Shen. And it wasn’t always that way.

The centerpiece of their investigation is a study of the socioeconomic status of American soldiers killed or wounded in World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and the Iraq/Afghanistan wars. Of course, the Pentagon does not provide such data, but they do list the home towns of the dead and wounded. The authors determined the median family incomes in the home counties of each casualty. Obviously, this introduces “rounding error” into the data, but it gives valuable information about whether the dead and wounded come from richer or poorer parts of the country. Here are the data for fatalities, with the median incomes adjusted to reflect dollars from the year 2000.

study

Clearly, as the U.S. has come to rely less on the draft and more on other forms of recruitment, what was once shared sacrifice has become more unequal. The results for non-fatal casualties are quite similar.

The authors attribute these results to two processes. The selection mechanism refers to differential selection into the armed forces of young people whose economic opportunities are limited, making them responsive to financial incentives the military offers. The sorting mechanism refers to the assignment of lower socioeconomic status soldiers to higher risk positions in the military, since they lack the education or job skills that would make them more useful away from the front lines.

It has been noted that soldiers injured in Iraq and Afghanistan have a higher survival rate than in previous wars, but return home with more serious injuries. This means that inequality continues long after the war. The authors note several studies showing that social class is an important factor affecting the health outcomes of veterans. Veterans from poorer counties return to communities with fewer resources to help in their readjustment, and their injuries place an additional financial burden on those communities.

Kriner and Shen did a national survey showing that only about half of the public is aware of these inequalities. They asked the following question of a national sample: “Thinking about the American soldiers who have died fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, what parts of the United States do you think they are coming from?” The alternatives were more from richer communities, more from poorer communities, or equally from richer and poorer communities. Forty-five percent believed that the sacrifice was shared equally, while 44% realized that poorer communities carried a larger part of the burden.

Finally, they did two web-based experiments measuring how Americans react to correct information about military inequality. In one of these, half the respondents were told that many more of the Iraq and Afghanistan fatalities came from socioeconomically disadvantaged communities, while those in the control group were not given this information. Fifty-six percent of those in the control group said the invasion of Iraq was a mistake, compared to 62% given information about inequality of sacrifice. A similar result was obtained in a second study measuring willingness to engage in future wars. As the authors state, “The invisibility of casaulty inequality artificially inflates public support for war and the leaders who wage it.”

We know from attribution theory that if the public believes that people in the armed forces freely chose to serve out of personal motives such as patriotism, rather than being driven by environmental forces such as economic necessity, they are more likely to be held responsible for the outcomes of their decisions. Thus, the invisibility of military inequality may contribute to tendencies to blame these vicitims for their deaths or injuries, since they “freely chose” to enlist.

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