Category Archives: Religion

Implicit Bias Against Atheists?

Cognitive psychology, Prejudice and discrimination, Religion, ,

Consider the following problem:

Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.

Which alternative is more probable?

A. Linda is a bank teller.

B. Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.

“A” is the correct answer. Since there are undoubtedly some bank tellers who are not feminists, “B” cannot be more probable than “A”. To answer “B” is to commit a conjunction fallacy, since the conjunction of two events (bank teller and feminist) cannot be more probable than one of them (bank teller) alone. We commit this error because we associate the other qualities mentioned in the description with being a feminist.

Will Gervais of the University of Kentucky and his colleagues used the conjunction fallacy to measure what they call “extreme intuitive moral prejudice against atheists.” Participants were 3,256 people from the United States and 12 other countries. (See the chart below for the countries). They read a description of a man who tortured animals as a child. As an adult, he engaged in several acts of violence, ending with the murder and mutilation of five homeless people. Half the participants from each country were asked:

Which alternative is more probable?

A. He is a teacher.

B. He is a teacher who is a religious believer.

The other participants were asked:

Which alternative is more probable?

A. He is a teacher.

B. He is a teacher who does not believe in god(s).

“B” is always the wrong answer, but the authors infer that if more people give this incorrect answer when the target is described as not believing in a god than when he is described as a religious believer, then the participants are (collectively) biased against atheists. Presumably, the respondents believe serial murderers are more likely to be atheists than religious people. Here are the results.

The chart shows the probability of a participant answering “B” when the target is an atheist compared to when he is religious, while statistically controlling for the participant’s gender, age, socioeconomic status and belief in god(s). There was bias against atheists in 12 of the 13 countries, the exception being Finland. Overall, people are about twice as likely to commit the conjunction fallacy when the target is described as an atheist (61%) than when he is described as religious (28%).

What is the effect of the respondents’ own belief in god(s) on answers to these questions? In the chart above, the individual’s certainty of the existence of a god increases from left to right. People at all levels of religious belief show prejudice against atheists, including atheists themselves—that is, people at the left who answered that the probability of a god’s existence is zero.

The authors did several followup studies. Using the same research method, they found that:

  • People are more likely to assume that a person who does not believe in god(s) is a serial murderer than a person who does not believe in evolution, the accuracy of horoscopes, the safety of vaccines, or the reality of global warming.
  • People are more likely to assume that a priest described as having molested young boys for decades is a priest who does not believe in god than a priest who does believe in god.

The assumption that morality depends on religious belief seems to be quite widespread, since it was obtained in religiously diverse cultures, including Christian, Buddhist, Hindu and Muslim societies. This association between atheism and bad behavior is all the more impressive given the lack of empirical evidence for a moral effect of religious beliefs.

On the other hand, 28% of the respondents who were given that choice saw the target as more likely to be a murderer if he was described as a religious believer than when his religiosity was not specified. This suggests that a minority of respondents associate religiosity with violence.

The authors describe their results as demonstrating an “intuitive” prejudice against atheists. They don’t indicate whether an intuitive belief operates consciously or without conscious intention. However, this prejudice seems to have some of the characteristics of an unconscious or implicit bias. It was measured using a fairly subtle technique. Participants were never asked to directly compare atheists with religious believers (although when the target was described as just a teacher, participants may have made the default assumption that he was religious). Furthermore, it is a bias shared by atheists themselves, suggesting that participants are repeating a popular cultural assumption, rather than reporting a belief that they have thoughtfully considered.

You may also be interested in reading:

The Implicit Association Test: Racial Bias on Cruise Control

Teaching Bias, Part 1

A Darker Side of Politics

Correction

Religion, Social psychology

In November 2015, I reported a study of 1170 children from six countries (Canada, China, Jordan, South Africa, Turkey, and the US) by Jean Ducety and his colleagues. The study appeared to show that children from Christian and Muslim households were less altruistic when playing a laboratory game than children from religiously unaffiliated households. It now appears that their conclusion was incorrect.

When correlating religion with altruism, it is necessary to statistically control unwanted variables that might explain both religiosity and altruism. The Ducety team claimed to have controlled for the age, socioeconomic status, and country of origin of their participants. However, a team of researchers headed by Azim Shariff pointed out that, although Ducety and his colleagues intended to statistically control for country of origin, they used a statistically incorrect procedure. When the data were reanalyzed correctly, the association between religion and altruism was no longer statistically significant. This is primarily due to low levels of generosity among children from South Africa and Turkey, two countries with a high level of religious affiliation.

The correct conclusion, then, is that religion has no effect on altruistic behavior. I’m not sure that religious people will be happy with this conclusion, but at least it’s less embarrassing than Ducety’s conclusion. Shariff and his colleagues also point out the following:

  • When nationality was controlled correctly, there was no longer an association between religion and the punitiveness of the children.
  • The association between religion and parents’ claims that their children are higher in empathy also disappeared when the data were reanalyzed.
  • However, there was still a significant association between family devoutness and the altruism of the children, with children from highly religious families being less generous than children from moderately religious homes.

This is an embarrassment for the Ducety group. Had the data been analyzed correctly, the study would probably not have been published.

In 2015, Sharif reported the results of a meta-analysis of 31 studies showing that, while religious people claim to engage in more prosocial behavior on self-report measures, there is no consistent effect of religion on behavioral tasks measuring altruism, such as the one used by Ducety group. He explains this in two ways. First, religious people are more likely to engage in socially desirable responding in which they exaggerate their good behavior. Secondly, laboratory tasks measuring altruism do not contain the contextual cues that sometimes elicit prosocial behavior in the real world, such as being asked by a clergyman to donate money.

In support of this second explanation, Sharif points to a second, separate meta-analysis of 25 studies of religious priming on prosocial behavior. In these studies, participants perform a task intended to remind them of their religious beliefs, such as reading Biblical passages, and are then given an opportunity to behave more or less generously. These studies find that religious primes increase the altruism of religious people, but have no effect on non-religious people.

Sharif explains the effects of religious primes in two ways. First, some religious rituals such as hymn-singing and prayer may create the emotional conditions which encourage people to behave prosocially. Secondly, these primes may remind religious people that they believe they are being observed by supernatural agents who will punish them if they behave badly.

My takeaway from Sharif’s research is that most opportunities for altruistic behavior in the real world probably do not contain religious primes. If I’m right, we should usually not expect religious people to practice the values that are preached to them.

An optional wonkish addendum:

Any time you do a correlational study, you must consider the possibility that your results are explained by some other variable that accidentally coincides with both of the variables of interest. For example, if you find that people who live near nuclear power plants are more likely to die of cancer, you must consider the possibility that poor people are more likely to live near nuclear power plants, and their poverty is the cause of their death rather than their exposure to radiation.

The usual approach to such alternative explanations is to remove their impact on the data through statistical analysis. However, it is not always clear whether an alternative explanation is a source of error which should be removed, or an integral part of the variable of interest.

The Shariff group seems to be saying that if children’s ungenerous behavior can be explained by their country of origin, it need no longer be attributed to their religion. But in a country like Turkey, where 99.8% of its citizens are Muslims, how can you separate its religion from the rest of its culture? In fact, statistically controlling for Turkish nationality precludes the possibility that the Muslim religion of its children will have any affect on the outcome of the study. Was this the right decision? (The situation in South Africa is less extreme, since only 80% of South Africans are Christians.)

An analogy may help. Suppose I do a survey of the gender gap in the salaries of U. S. adults. I statistically control for variables like age, socioeconomic status, education, work experience, etc., and I find that men are paid more than women for the same job. But suppose a critic maintains that tall people are respected more than short people, and therefore paid more. He argues that I am obligated to statistically control for the height of my respondents. Since men are on average taller than women, when I statistically eliminate the effect of height, the association between gender and salary disappears. Does this mean that women are not discriminated against in the workplace, but only short people are?

You might argue that this is a bad analogy because gender is a more plausible explanation for wage discrimination than height. But is nationality a more plausible explanation for lack of altruism than religion? Or did it only seem that way because the negative effect of religion on altruism was unexpected?

You may also be interested in reading:

More Bad News For Religion

Who Speaks for the Nones?

Politics, Religion

As the percentage of Americans who call themselves Christians declines, the number of Christians in Congress continues to hold steady. In the new 115th Congress, 91% identify themselves as Christians, according to new research by the Pew Research Center. This is the same as the last Congress, and not much different from the 95% of Christians in 1960-61, the earliest years from which data are available.

Among 293 Republicans, 291 are Christians and 2 are Jews. The 242 Democrats are slightly more diverse, with 194 (80%) Christians, 28 Jews, three Buddhists, three Hindus, two Muslims, one Unitarian and one who is religiously unaffiliated (Arizona’s Rep. Kyrsten Sinema). There were also ten Democrats who declined to answer.

Protestants, Catholics and Jews are all overrepresented in Congress, compared to their percentage of the population. The only major group that is underrepresented is the “nones”—the religiously affiliated. As previously reported here, the nones went from 16% of the population in 2007 to 23% in 2014, while the number of Christians dropped from 78% to 71%. In Congress, 91% of members are Christians and .2% are nones, unless some of those ten Democrats who refused to answer are trying to hide their lack of religiosity.

It is likely that the same forces that result in minority rule by rural, small state Republicans—structural biases in the composition of the House, the Senate and the electoral college—also account for the overrepresentation of Christians.

In addition their differences on obvious culture war issues such abortion and gay rights, Christians are less likely than the religiously unaffiliated to favor government assistance for the poor and less likely to favor environmental protection. They are more likely to say that peace is best assured through military strength. In addition, religious people are more likely to be racially prejudiced.

You may also be interested in reading:

And Then There Were Nones

More Bad News for Religion

Why the Minority Rules

More Bad News for Religion

Religion, Social psychology,

In May, I reported on the Pew Research Center’s 2014 Religious Landscape Study, a survey of a quota sample of 35,000 adults, with a margin of error of plus or minus .6%. The first installment of their results concentrated on the size and demographic characteristics of various religious groups. The big news was that Americans with no religious affiliation (the “nones”) increased from 16% in 2007 to 23% in 2014, while those calling themselves Christians dropped from 78% to 71%. The biggest increase in the percentage of nones occurred among Milennials—people born after 1980.

Pew has published a second installment of results from the survey, focusing on religious beliefs and practices. The share of Americans who say they believe in God has declined from 92% in 2007 to 89% in 2014, while those who claim to be “absolutely certain” that God exists dropped from 71% to 63%. These declines are most pronounced among younger adults. This chart breaks down a number of superstitious beliefs and practices by age. All of them have declined since 2007.

in-many-ways-younger-americans-are-less-religious-than-older-americans

Pew also looked at the political beliefs of religious and nonreligious participants. Acceptance of homosexuality has increased dramatically among both religious and nonreligious participants, while support for abortion is relatively unchanged. For the first time, the nones are now the largest single group (28%) among Democrats. Evangelical Protestants are the largest group (38%) of Republicans. Not surprisingly given their political affiliations, religious people are more likely than nones to oppose government aid to the poor, to oppose stricter environmental regulations, and to see increased immigration as a change for the worse. Belief in evolution differs sharply between affiliated (55%) and nonaffiliated people (82%), and is nearly universal among atheists (95%) and agnostics (96%).

By and large, Americans see religion as a force for good in the society. Eighty-nine percent say that churches “bring people together and strengthen community bonds,” 87% say they “play an important role in helping the poor and needy,” and 75% say they “protect and strengthen morality in society.” However, some of these claims are becoming harder to defend in light of recent research. There is strong evidence that American religious people are higher in racism than nonreligious Americans. A recent study looks at some related moral behaviors.

Altruism refers to behavior that benefits others at some cost to oneself. Although there are studies that suggest that religious people report more charitable giving than nonreligious people, these self-reports are suspect since religious people are more likely to engage in socially desirable responding–a tendency to over-report one’s good behavior and under-report the bad. On the other hand, the research is fairly clear that religious people are more punitive in their evaluations of bad behavior than nonreligious people. For example, religiously affiliated whites are more likely to support the death penalty than unaffiliated whites. (Large majorities of black and Hispanic Americans oppose the death penalty regardless of religious affiliation.)

Dr. Jean Decety of the University of Chicago and his colleagues studied moral behavior among a broad and diverse sample of 1,170 children aged 5-12 in six countries (Canada, China, Jordan, South Africa, Turkey, and the US). Children were assigned to the religious affiliation reported by their parents. They were 24% Christian, 43% Muslim, and 28% nonreligious. Other religions were not reported often enough to include in the statistical analysis.

Altruism was measured using the Dictator Game, in which children were allowed to divide an attractive resource—in this case, ten stickers—between themselves a peer. The measure is the number of stickers shared with others. Religiously affiliated children were less generous than nonaffiliated children, with no significant difference in generosity between Christians and Muslims. Importantly, the negative association between religion and altruism was greater among the older children (aged 8-12), suggesting that as children come to understand their family’s beliefs better, the differences between those from religious and nonreligious families increase.

decety

To measure punitiveness, the authors had children watch videos depicting mild interpersonal harms and asked them to evaluate the “meanness” of the behavior and to suggest a level of punishment for the perpetrator. Religious children saw these behaviors as more “mean” and suggested greater punishment than nonreligious children. Muslim children evaluated the behaviors more negatively than Christian children.

The authors also asked the parents of these children to rate them on empathy and sensitivity to justice. In contrast to the actual behavior of the children, the religious parents rated their children as higher in empathy than the nonreligious parents. They also rated their children as more sensitive to justice. This could be another instance of socially desirable responding by the religious parents.

If these results, as well as the differences in prejudice and discrimination, were more widely known, people might be less likely to see religion as a force for good in society and less likely to favor exempting religious institutions from taxation.

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And Then There Were Nones

Power and Corruption, Part 1

And Then There Were Nones

Religion

Last year, I posted the results of the General Social Survey showing that, in 2012, 20% of American adults reported themselves as having “no religion,” and that these folks—referred to by demographers as the “nones”—are increasing by about .6% per year. This month, the Pew Research Group released the results of their 2014 Religious Landscape Study. This survey, undertaken every seven years, is based on the results of a quota sample of over 35,000 adults and has a margin of error of plus or minus .6%. Although Pew refers to their nones as “unaffiliated,” the results are strikingly consistent.

Pew reports that 22.8% of the population were nones in 2014, up 6.7% from 16.1% in 2007. Meanwhile, those calling themselves Christians declined from 78.4% to 70.6%. This amounts to an increase of 19 million nones, for a new total of 56 million. Among all religious groups, the nones are second in size only to evangelical Protestants. A followup question showed that, of this 22.8%, 3.1% said they were atheists, 4% claimed to be agnostic, and 15.8% believed “nothing in particular.” This leaves open the possibility that some of the nones engage in spiritual practices, pray, or believe in one or more gods. There was also a 6% increase in those saying that religion is “not too” or “not at all important” in their lives.

religionbig-png

 

The Pew researchers offer two explanations for this shift.

  • Generational replacement. The most dramatic increases in the percentage of nones occurred among younger adults. However, they increased across all generations, even rising by 2% among people over 70.
  • Switching religions. Among those who report switching their religious affiliation, the nones showed the largest gains of any group. Eighteen percent of Americans who were raised in a religious faith now claim to be unaffiliated.

Another perspective on this trend comes from the 2015 State of Atheism in America, a study by the Barna Group. It combines the results of four surveys of 23,000 adults conducted in 2011 through 2014. The Barna Group calls their nones the “unchurched,” meaning that they say they haven’t attended church in the last six months. This results in a larger group, about 36% of the total. They find that 25% of the unchurched are either atheists or agnostics, a group they call “skeptics.” I find this a more interesting group than folks who believe “nothing in particular,” since they would seem to have given some thought to religion.

The Barna Group identifies five demographic shifts among their skeptics when they are compared to the same group in a 1993 survey they conducted.

bu-032415-IG-2

  1. They are younger. In fact, 34% of them are between 18 and 30.
  2. They are more educated. Half of them are college graduates. Only 32% of Americans over 25 have graduated from college.
  3. A higher percentage are women. Male skepticism increased too, but not as much as among women.
  4. They are more racially diverse. This is due largely to an increase in skepticism among Hispanics and especially Asians.
  5. They are more regionally dispersed. The Northeast and West continue to have higher percentages of skeptics, but the differences are not as great as in the past.

The last three trends suggest a mainstreaming of skepticism. Rather than being a distinctive subgroup, atheists and agnostics are becoming more broadly representative of the population. One major exception, however, is the continuing underrepresentation of African-Americans.

The Barna Group’s stated goal is to reconnect with skeptics and bring them back under the influence of superstition, so they asked skeptics what they thought of Christian churches. They note four common responses, although they don’t report the percentages who gave each one.

  1. The church is group of people who share a physical space but are not otherwise connected to one another in meaningful ways.
  2. The church adds little of value to their community.
  3. The church stands for the wrong political policies: war, sexual and physical violence, prevention of gay marriage and reproductive freedom, etc.
  4. Church leaders are not trustworthy.

The third response supports the backlash hypothesis—that young people are leaving the Christian religion because they disagree with its conservative politics.

What can we conclude from all of this? Due to the positive association of religiosity with age, the percentage of nones is likely to continue to increase. This is good news for liberals. In an earlier post, I presented evidence suggesting that the most important causes of religiosity are poverty and lack of education. Barring an increase in the financial desperation of the middle class or a weakening of our system of public education—both very real possibilities—the future of organized religion does not seem very bright.

You may also be interested in reading:

The Revolt of the Nones, Part 1

The Revolt of the Nones, Part 2

The God Squad, Part 1: Religion as Selfish Individualism